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Abstract The rule of law is a foundational principle of the EU’s identity. It implies
inter alia that member states are required to comply with this principle in their
respective national realm. In that regard, the paper argues that respect for the rule of
law can be conceptualized as an erga omes partes obligation: its indivisible nature
entails that each country owes it to the EU, the other member states, as well as
individuals. Yet the EU institutional system reveals some shortcomings as to the
oversight on systemic deficiencies of the rule of law at national level, since the
Article 7 procedure is not a sound response to systemic threats to the rule of law. In
the light of a Council’s invitation, the Commission has proposed a complementary
mechanism, which provides for a political oversight aimed essentially at entering
into a dialogue with the concerned member state. This paper, while challenging
some critical remarks to the Commission’s Communication, advocates that it is
consistent with the Treaties. Finally, the paper highlights some positive and negative
aspects of the Council’s conclusions aimed at enacting a new political dialogue
among all member states within the Council to promote and safeguard the rule of
law.
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1 Introduction
The rule of law is a foundational principle of the EU’s identity, albeit Article 2 TEU
does not provide for its definition. It is indeed a theoretical principle rather difficult
to construe in detail,1 and unsurprisingly so it is as regards the EU legal system.
Wide-ranging in scope, it is no doubt arguable that the rule of law has no less
than three facets.2 First, it is a legal parameter which constraints European
institutions: their activities are subject to a judicial review by the ECJ, which
includes the dynamic interplay with national judges through the preliminary ruling
procedure.3 As the ECJ’s Kadi I and Kadi II rulings show, a substantive (or ‘thick’4)
notion of the rule of law prevails in the field of individual economic sanctions
against terrorism. Both the rights of defence and the right to effective judicial
review (i.e. the right to be informed of the reasons underlying listing, the right to
defence, to be heard, and to have access to evidence) have been construed as
inherent parts of the rule of law on which the Union is founded.5 Indeed, the overall
case law of the ECJ regarding the judicial review of individual restrictive measures
adopted by the EU, illustrates that such a review is indispensable for ensuring a fair
balance between the maintenance of international peace and security, as
1 Kleinfeld Belton (2005), p. 8 ff. (discussing the rule of law as composed of five separate, socially
desirable goods, or ends: (1) a government bound by law, (2) equality before the law, (3) law and order,
(4) predictable and efficient justice, and (5) human rights). See also Magen (2009), p. 56 ff. (contending
inter alia that legal scholars and practitioners should reorient their approach to the notion of the rule of
law; embracing a substantive, operative conceptualization which understands the rule of law as a key
dimension of democratic quality, and which views the development of rule of law conditions in domestic
systems as integral to broader processes of socio-political development within those systems); and Mak
and Taekema (2016), p. 25 ff. (identifying a core meaning of the rule of law in the reduction of the
arbitrary use of power).
2 Fallon (1997), p. 1 ff. (pointing out that the rule of law needs to be understood as a concept of multiple,
complexly interwoven strands). It is indeed a ‘multifaceted legal principle’ according to Pech (2010),
p. 361.
3 Lenaerts (2007), p. 1625 ff.
4 Magen, n. 1, p. 60.
5 Consequently, the ECJ is in charge with the task of progressively forging its content. See Joined Cases
C-402/05 and 415/05 P, Kadi EU:C:2008:461 in particular §§281–283, 331 ff. (Kadi I); Joined Cases
C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and United Kingdom v. Kadi, EU:C:2013:518
(Kadi II). It is noteworthy, however, that the ECJ has subsequently affirmed that the rights of the defense,
as stated in Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, include the right to be heard and the right
to have access to the file, subject to legitimate interests in maintaining confidentiality (Case C-280/12 P
Council v. Fulmen and Mahmoudian EU:C:2013:775, §§59 and 60). Moreover, as the General Court held
in its judgment in Case T-390/08 Bank Melli Iran v. Council EU:T:2009:I-3967, §97, when sufficiently
precise information has been disclosed, so as to enable the entity concerned effectively to state its point of
view on the evidence adduced against it by the Council, the principle of respect for the rights of the
defense does not mean that the institution is obliged spontaneously to grant access to the documents in its
file. It is only on the request of the party concerned that the Council is required to provide access to all
non-confidential official documents concerning the measure at issue. It would in fact be excessive to
require spontaneous disclosure of the material in the file, given that when a fund-freezing measure is
adopted it is not certain that the person concerned intends to check, by means of access to the file, the
matters of fact supporting the allegations made against it by the Council.
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encapsulated in the UN Charter, and the protection of the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the persons concerned.6
Secondly, that foundational principle concerns securing respect for the rule of
Union law. In that regard, it also covers the complex relationship between the
supremacy of EU law, i.e. its binding authority, and the national reservations aimed
at scrutinizing the legality of secondary law on several grounds (human rights, ultra
vires and constitutional identity).7
Thirdly, it does have an external dimension too, i.e. the promotion of the rule of
law beyond the EU. Its political institutions are committed to export principles of
democracy and respect for human rights from the EU to third entities.8 The EU,
along with the USA, considers the spread of the rule of law and respect for human
rights ‘a strategic priority as well as a moral necessity’.9 One may argue that the EU
is not capable, at least not always, of achieving results when it comes to exporting
its values on the global scene. However, while admitting that sometimes the EU acts
unevenly or does too little, external circumstances pose serious obstacles to
delivering on the promise of promoting the rule of law throughout the world.
This paper focuses on a specific, internal facet of the role played by this
foundational principle in the EU as far as member states are concerned. After having
sketched a conceptualization of the rule of law obligations arising out of Article 2
TEU (Sect. 2), it first addresses the EU institutional shortcomings as regards the
oversight on systemic deficiencies of the rule of law at national level (Sect. 3).
Secondly, it suggests that the early warning tool set out in the 2014 Commission’s
Communication is consistent with the Treaties (Sect. 4). It then highlights the
political debate in the Council and the solution it has adopted under the Italian
Presidency (Sects. 5 and 6). A brief conclusion will then be drawn (Sect. 7).
2 The Internal Dimension of the Rule of Law as Regards the Member
States: A Conceptualization
Insofar as its internal dimension is concerned, respect for the rule of law challenges
not only the EU, but also the institutions of member states whose commitment for
democratic principles and constitutional values is a foundational basis for EU
membership.10 Suffice it to recall that its effective respect is required before a third
6 See, to that effect, Kadi II ruling, n. 5, §131, and C-550/09, E and F, ECLI:EU:C:2010:382, §57.
Indeed, restrictive measures may adversely affect the working and the family life of the person concerned,
as well as the public disgrace of that person which those measures cause (see, to that effect, the Kadi I
ruling, n. 5, §§358, 369 and 375; C-27/09 P, France v. People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:853, §64; C-539/10, P Al-Aqsa v. Council and Netherlands v. Al-Aqsa,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:711, §120, and C-239/12, P Abdulrahim v. Council and Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:331 and case law cited thereto).
7 Editorial Comments (2016), pp. 598–599.
8 Generally Cremona (2011); Pech (2012), passim (offering a comprehensive overview of how the EU
promotes compliance with the rule of law abroad); Cremona (2016), p. 3 ff.
9 Joint Statement by the European Union and the United States Working Together to Promote
Democracy and Support Freedom, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Worldwide, June 20, 2005.
10 Schroeder (2015).
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state even begins negotiating for accession. This domestic facet of the rule of law is
pivotal as to the EU integration process. In particular, it is strictly intertwined with
the principles of mutual trust and recognition of judgments in both criminal and
civil matters, which features the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.11 In fact,
the mutual recognition of national decisions, as a cornerstone of judicial co-
operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union,12 works smoothly as
long as the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, including the rule of law, are not only
common to the member states, but effectively guaranteed within their domestic legal
orders. Since the rule of law concerns also individuals, the notion of ‘respect’ for the
rule of law in the national realm should be considered in the light of Kantian
perception of persons as being the center of the society, as well as ends in
themselves, and not as means for something else.13 Consequently, respect for the
rule of law leads to the consequence of positive obligations being imposed on
competent authorities to take the necessary measures in their powers to secure that
respect. If necessary, states have also to adopt legislative, administrative and
adjudicatory measures to ensure effective enjoyment of it within their respective
territories.
It would be inaccurate to underestimate this intense and structural relationship
between the rule of law and the principle of mutual trust,14 which the ECJ has
qualified as a constitutional principle.15 The components of that binomial
relationship appear so closely tied that a post-EU accession disruption in respect
for the internal rule of law, adversely affects the principle of mutual confidence.16
The proper operation of the EU construct is threatened, unless member states
11 See Article 67(3) TFEU (‘the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters’) and namely the
wording set out in Article 81(1) TFEU, as well as in Articles 67(4) TFEU, and 81(2) a), which refer,
perhaps more emphatically, respectively, to ‘the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial
decisions’ in criminal matters, and to the ‘principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial
decisions in civil matters’. That relationship is evident as regards the system laid down in the so-called
Brussels I Regulation (No. 44/2001): see ex multis Case C-116/02, Gasser, EU:C:2003, 657, §72.
12 Baratta (2009), p. 6 ff.; Nascimbene (2011), p. 787 ff.; Lenaerts (2015), p. 525.
13 The eighteenth century German philosopher, Kant, was the first major Western philosopher arguing
that persons are ends in themselves, and not a means to something else, with an absolute dignity to be
respected (Kant (1982), p. 144 ff.).
14 ECJ case law offers several judicial examples of this intense and structural relationship. In fact the ECJ
has construed the member states’ compliance with the rule of law and fundamental rights as a
rebuttable presumption (Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and Others, EU:C:2011:865, §78 to §80 and
§83; C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, §37; Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014, §191). Lenaerts, n. 12,
528 (arguing that the principle of mutual trust is not only a constitutional axiom that inspires legislative
actions at EU level, but it also gives rise to judicially enforceable standards). Indeed, the ECJ has
highlighted the fundamental importance of the principle of mutual trust since it ‘allows an area without
internal borders to be created and maintained’ (Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, §191).
15 C-411/10 and C-493/10, n. 14, §78 ff. (as to the treatment of asylum seekers in all member states
according to the requirements of the Charter, the Geneva Convention and the ECHR, the ECJ pointed out
that at issue ‘here is the raison d’eˆtre of the European Union and the creation of an area of freedom,
security and justice and, in particular, the Common European Asylum System, based on mutual
confidence and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law and, in
particular, fundamental rights’, at §85).
16 On the concept of systemic deficiency in constitutional crises see von Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014),
pp. 59–96.
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unequivocally observe a minimum level of constitutional homogeneity. Should a
member state fail to respect the rule of law, or democracy and human rights at a
domestic level, the other EU countries would be entitled to take action under the
ECJ’s oversight.17 In theory, they could lodge a claim under Article 259 TFEU,
although this procedure has been used rarely and never enacted to challenge an
alleged violation of the rule of law in another member state.18 More pragmatically,
national judges might ask for a preliminary ruling insofar as, for instance, according
to Article 45 of Regulation 1215/2012, they consider the right of fair trial was not
guaranteed in a concrete case.19
As a result, respect for the rule of law in the national realm can be
conceptualized as an erga omes partes obligation: its indivisible nature entails
that each country owes it to the Union, to the other member states and to
individuals as well.20 As regards the latter, one can advocate in passing that once
the respect for the rule of law is enshrined in the Treaties, individuals, as being
subjects of the EU legal system,21 are entitled to its protection even with respect
to the member state to which they belong or live. It is part of their legal heritage
or ‘legal assets’.22
That seems to be the logical consequence stemming from a systematic
application of Treaty provisions (Articles 2 and 7 TEU), and the general principles
of mutual trust and recognition of judgments.23 This underlying rationale is based
on a ‘thick’ rule of law concept.24 It appears also largely coherent with the
17 The EU legal order is a self-contained regime, which does not permit unilateral actions, in contrast to
international law.
18 Kochenov (2015), passim.
19 Namely, they could ask the ECJ if one of the parties had been denied the opportunity to arrange for his
defense where the judgment was given in default of appearance in a civil action linked to criminal
proceedings.
20 Ex multis Cases 294/83, Les Verts EU:C:1986:1339, §23; 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst,
EU:C:1989:2859, §19, C-279/09 DEB EU:C:2010:13849, §58 (as regards the separation of powers in
the member states).
21 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p. 12 (pointing out that the EU is a legal order the
subjects of which comprise also the nationals of member states since it confers ‘upon them rights which
become part of their legal heritage’).
22 EU law ‘just as it imposes burdens on individuals, is also intended to give rise to rights which become
part of their legal assets. Those rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaties but
also by virtue of obligations which they impose in a clearly defined manner both on individuals and on the
Member States and the EU institutions’ (Case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, §20, and
to that effect, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428, §31, and
case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, §19 and the case law cited).
23 It is worth noting that the principle of mutual recognition in the field of internal market is quite
different from the way it operates concerning the judicial cooperation in civil law and criminal matters.
Unlike in the internal market, the principle of mutual recognition in civil law is often linked with the
protection of individual fundamental rights (Baratta (2010), pp. 312 and 391). The same holds true as
regards cooperation in criminal matters. Yet, in this field it is also relevant to ensure the effectiveness of
national criminal law in order to prevent criminals from using free movement to achieve impunity (Case
C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:20113:107).
24 Bingham (2010), p. 67: ‘the rule of law … demands the protection of fundamental rights’ (at 33), and
quite likely democracy. On the link between rule of law and respect for human rights MacCormick
(2007), p. 189.
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Commission’s assessment.25 The rule of law is indeed a complex and composite
legal concept against which EU countries’ activity is to be evaluated. In essence
their domestic legal orders should be framed to guarantee and promote individual
rights.26 Supremacy of law, fundamental rights, democracy and the right to a fair
trial, all form a unique set of values that member states are expected to protect at a
national level, since they are instrumental for ensuring the correct functioning of a
supranational system without borders for citizens, goods and judgments. This is so
regardless of whether a member state is implementing EU law or acting
autonomously, as it is clear arguing from Article 7 TEU.27
3 Facing the Crises of the Rule of Law at National Level
In 2013, while the Italian Presidency was approaching, the EU institutional system
had revealed some shortcomings as regards the oversight on systemic deficiencies of
the rule of law at national level. The author, being at that time legal advisor at the
Italian Permanent Representative, was aware of the doctrinal (and political) debate
revealing some weaknesses of that system.
Firstly, as it has often been observed, infringements pursuant to Article 258
TFEU and the preliminary ruling procedures do not tackle that issue appropriately
since they do not address systemic threats to the rule of law. As a matter of course,
these procedures attribute the EU powers of action covering situations where
specific EU law applies and remedies to individual breaches, unlike Article 7
procedure, which it is not confined solely to areas covered by EU law and concerns
risks of systemic violations of the rule of law. For instance, the European
Commission tackled specific failures by Hungary to fulfil its obligations under EU
law, and on 17 January 2012, it launched three infringement procedures against
Hungary. Two of them came to an end with an infringement ruling of the ECJ – they
concerned the equal treatment in employment and occupation by adopting national
legislative provisions relating to the age-limit for compulsory retirement of judges,
prosecutors and notaries, and the protection of individuals with respect to the
processing of personal data, as well as the free movement of the same data.28 Even
25 See Annex I in Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council. A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014)158final, 1–2, and the case
law cited therein. According to the Commission six legal principles are included in the core of the rule of
law: legality; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; independent and
impartial courts; effective judicial review; equality before the law.
26 Zolo (2006), pp. 17 and 21.
27 De Witte and Toppenburg (2004), pp. 59–82.
28 C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687; see Vincze (2013), p. 489 ff.; and C-288/
12, Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2014:237. The third infringement procedure concerned the
independence of the Hungarian Central Bank. On the very same day in which the Commission launched
the three infringement procedures the Hungarian Office of the Government’s Spokesperson replied that
‘The Hungarian government takes note of the Commission’s decision to examine the compliance of
certain Hungarian laws with the acquis communautaire following the procedures laid down in the Treaty.
Hungary regards this as an opportunity to engage in a technical dialogue based on verifiable facts with the
competent authority, the European Commission, acting as the guardian of the Treaties. The Hungarian
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though the related procedures as a whole (pre-litigation procedure and the procedure
before the Court) took less than 1 year (due also to the ECJ decision to accept the
Commission’s request for the application of the accelerated procedure), the impact
on the respect for the rule of law was clearly minor in terms of scope. The same
holds true even as to the references for preliminary rulings, which may highlight
situations of systemic deficiencies for protection of fundamental rights in the
member states. That is actually possible in exceptional situations resulting in a
disproportionate burden being borne by them and their temporary inability to cope
with those situations in practice.29
Secondly, the Article 7 procedure, according to some observers, is not a sound
response as well. To trigger Article 7 is not only a ‘nuclear option’ per se,30 but it
implies several discretionary steps being taken by the political institutions. Besides
the fact that the jurisdiction of the ECJ covers solely the procedural stipulations
contained in Article 7 TUE,31 may raise suspects as regards its political underlying
legitimacy, given that the state concerned might claim a lack of control over the
political institutions. Yet, as a matter of fact, it has never been used, although in
2012 some member states faced calls for the EU to apply this sanctioning
procedure.32 Should it be triggered, it might offer some benefits for the resilience
of the overall system. That is one of the options the European Parliament was
thinking of in 2013,33 and likely when it called on the Commission to assess the
respect for the rule of law in Hungary by pointing out that ‘(r)einstating the death
penalty in Hungary would breach the EU Treaties and Charter of fundamental
Footnote 28 continued
government considers the independence of the Central Bank, the Judiciary and the Data Protection
Authority as important as does the European Commission. Therefore there is no disagreement with the
institutions of the European Union on the importance of basic principles, common European values and
achievements. A thorough analysis of the Commission’s arguments will be started. Our aim is to give
satisfactory and comprehensive answers to the questions raised, and to find a solution for the problematic
issues as soon as possible, preferably without going through the full infringement procedure’ (press
release, The European Commission’s decision of 17 January 2012 on the infringement procedures against
Hungary).
29 C-411/10 and C-493/10, n. 14, footnote 14 §87 (whereby the governments intervening before the
Grand Chamber recognized that Greece in 2010 was ‘the point of entry in the European Union of almost
90 % of illegal immigrants, that influx resulting in a disproportionate burden being borne by it compared
to other Member States and the inability to cope with the situation in practice’). See also C-4/11, Puid,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:740, §§30–35.
30 J.M.D. Barroso, State of the Union 2012 Address, Plenary Session of the European Parliament/
Strasbourg, 12 September 2012, 1–8, p. 6.
31 See Article 269 TFEU. As the Commission pointed out in 2003, Article 7 procedure entails inter alia
to conduct a ‘meticulous examination of issues linked to respect for democracy and fundamental rights in
the Member States’: COM(2003)606final, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. Respect for and promotion of the
values on which the Union is based, p. 4, and pp. 5–6, as to the scope of that procedure, and to the ECJ’s
power of judicial review of the decision determining that there is a serious and persistent breach of
common values or a clear risk of such a breach.
32 See Fundamental Rights Agency, The European Union as a Community of values: safeguarding
fundamental rights in times of crises, Luxembourg (2013), p. 19 ff.
33 See Agence Europe, HUNGARY: Another debate and another headache to bring Orban into line,
Brussels, 1 April 2013.
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rights’.34 Abolition of the death penalty in the member states appears to be one of the
fundamental values on which the EU is founded. It is worth recalling that no reservation
is permitted as regards Protocol N 6 to the ECHR on the abolition of death penalty.
That being said, complementary mechanisms were widely perceived as needed in
order to foster the reaction capability of the EU legal order as regards systemic risks
of violating the rule of law at national level. At the same time, several legal
constraints were emerging. It suffices to recall that, after a comprehensive discussion
on the topic in April 2013, the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting held in
Luxembourg on 6–7 June considered that respect for the rule of law is a pre-requisite
for the protection of fundamental rights. It further called ‘on the Commission to take
forward the debate in line with the Treaties on the possible need for and shape of a
collaborative and systematic method to tackle these issues’ (emphasis added).
It would have been quite unrealistic to advocate for a revision of the Treaties, or
even the conclusion of an international agreement outside the EU legal framework
to fill the gap in the system.35 To say the least, both options were time consuming
and their possible outcome quite unpredictable since a reluctant member state could
decide not to ratify the relevant international instrument. Thus, it was clear that any
initiative in this area could not extend the institutional remit beyond the existing
Treaties. This is not to say that other solutions requiring Treaty amendments were
unwelcome. The problem was that many instances called for an immediate response
to rule of law crises in some member states, as both the initiative of four foreign
Ministers and the debate in the European Parliament clearly showed.36
As a matter of course, the Council’s invitation may be viewed as generic. Yet
vagueness is quite typical of political documents. Be that as it may, the Council noticed
that it was, inter alia, of critical importance: (1) tomake full use of existingmechanisms;
(2) to consider the full range of possible models, while stressing the need for approaches
that could be accepted by all member states by consensus. Thus, any Council initiative
had to be coherent with the Treaties and, at the same time, had to be adopted without a
vote in as much as a complete accord existed between the Governments.
4 The Consistency of the Commission’s Communication
with the Treaties
When the Commission issued the Communication,37 it could be reasonably argued
that it fell, and actually falls, within the mechanism set out by the Treaties. The
Communication builds upon the Article 7 procedure, providing an early warning tool
34 See Agence Europe, Hungary: New resolution criticises fundamental rights situation, Brussels, 10/06/
2015: MEPs added that the death penalty is ‘incompatible with the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights on which the union is
founded’ and that any member state reintroducing the death penalty would be ‘in violation of the Treaties
and of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (ibidem.).
35 See the Council Legal Service Opinion, No. 10296714, para. 27.
36 See Sect. 4.
37 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘A New EU
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’, COM(2014)158final, Strasbourg, 11 March 2014. See
Kochenov et al. (2015), pp. 689 ff.
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aimed essentially at entering into political dialogue with the concerned member state.
It intends to find a preventive (or maybe deterrent) solution on a consensual basis in
order to prevent emerging threats to the rule of law from developing into a serious
breach within the meaning of Article 7. Such a mechanism is to be triggered before
that procedure and ultimately complements it, while being careful not to affect the
launch of infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in case of the breach of
specific EU law provisions.38
In brief, the Framework is to be activated as a subsidiary instrument, that is to
say, when the national (rule of law) safeguards do not seem capable of effectively
addressing those threats. It is divided into three phases. First, the Commission,
after having collected all available data and information, initiates a dialogue with
the member state concerned, by sending a ‘rule of law opinion’, which amounts to
a warning to the member state – and substantiating its concerns when it believes
that there are clear indications of a systemic threat to the rule of law. It gives the
member state concerned the possibility to reply since it is expected to cooperate
with the Commission in accordance with the loyal cooperation rule (Article 4(3)
TEU).39 The opinion is not made public. Second, if the matter is not satisfactorily
resolved, the Commission issues a ‘rule of law recommendation’, while providing
for a fixed time limit to solve problems. The state concerned is required to inform
the Commission of the steps taken to that effect. The Commission makes public
the main content of its recommendation. In the third stage, the Commission ‘will
monitor the follow-up by the member state concerned given to the recommen-
dation addressed to it’. If there is no satisfactory follow-up, the Commission can
resort to one of the mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU. At all stages of the
procedure, the Commission keeps the European Parliament and Council regularly
and closely informed, and may benefit from external expertise and in particular the
Fundamental Rights Agency and other entities specifically named in the
recommendation.
Unfortunately, the Commission’s Communication does not address in depth the
issue of its consistency with the Treaties. It in fact points out that that Framework ‘is
based on Commission competences as provided for by existing Treaties’.40
38 The text aims to strengthen the monitoring of compliance in the member state of the rule of law,
through a process, which leads to the application of Article 7 TEU (the so-called ‘nuclear option’). In fact,
the conditions and the legal consequences of this provision make it applicable, according to the
Commission, as an instrument of last resort resulting in some contexts even inappropriate. To confirm
this, the Commission preferred to use as a deterrent means infringement proceedings with respect to
Hungary and Romania (n. 27). After explaining the importance of the rule of law into the Union, the
Commission shapes the ‘new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law’ (at 5), moving from the
assumption of the existence of a ‘systemic threat’ (ibidem.) to the rule of law in the member states. The
Communication utilises the term ‘threats’ (which does not require an actual breach) to indicate the
‘political, institutional and/or legal order of a Member State as such, its constitutional structure,
separation of powers, the independence or impartiality of the judiciary, or its system of judicial review
including constitutional justice where it exists’ (at 7). Threats means ‘result of the adoption of new
measures or of widespread practices of public authorities and the lack of domestic redress’ (at 7).
39 Peers (2014); Mori (2016), p. 207.
40 Communication, n. 36, p. 9.
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Nevertheless, the legal issue was on the table, since some member states
raised it almost immediately after the four Foreign Ministers’ letter.41 In
addition, as is known, the Council Legal Service issued a negative legal opinion,
now being made public, arguing that the Communication is not consistent with
primary law.
By contrast, a completely different assessment, as I said earlier, is possible and
reasonable. Let’s address this issue concisely. To start with, the Communication
does not aim to enlarge the areas of EU competence. As the ‘new Rule of Law
Framework’ is to be enacted within the mechanisms provided for in Article 7, to
claim a violation of Article 5 TEU, i.e. the doctrine of attributed powers to the EU
as a whole, seems hardly convincing.42
Certainly, another aspect of the principle of conferral is relevant – institutions
and organs ought to act within the limits laid down by the Treaties ‘and in
conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in’ thereto
(Article 13(2) TEU). Admittedly the Commission was seeking to fill a gap within
Article 7 on the assumption, shared with several Brussels quarters, that a
comprehensive enhancement of the legal tools concerning the respect for the
internal rule of law was needed.43 The legal problem was: if the Commission were
to carry out the ‘new Rule of Law Framework’, would it circumvent powers
attributed to it pursuant to Article 7? Or more broadly, may an institution, absent a
specific provision, supplement existing legal instruments through a normative
activity that, moreover, is generally felt as needed? And if so what, if any, are the
limits?
That is a matter of interpretation to be solved by taking into account the
principles of division of powers and institutional balance as defined by the ECJ case
law.44 Since the Commission may launch an Article 7 procedure whenever a
member state is allegedly posing ‘a clear risk of a serious breach’ or ‘a serious and a
persistent breach’ of the values set out in Article 2 TEU (and that, as discussed, even
outside the areas covered by EU law), the Commission’s activity under the
Communication appears in principle covered by the attributed powers under
primary law. Arguably, Article 7 confers to the Commission a discretionary task,
which is, on the one hand, aimed at pursuing the primary objective of guaranteeing
the effectiveness of some basic values in the domestic legal orders. Insofar as that
provision is rather open-ended, the ‘Pre-Article 7 Procedure’, as envisaged by the
41 As is known, in March 2013 the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands
asked to the President of the Commission to vigorously protect EU fundamental values – democracy, rule
of law and human rights. In their perspective a new mechanism was necessary. The topic was examined
by the Council on its meeting of 18 March 2014, in which several legal issues were raised by the member
states.
42 Contra Council Opinion, n. 34, para. 15.
43 von Bogdandy and Ioannidis, n. 16, p. 59.
44 An illustrative example of this approach is Case C-233/02, France v. Commission, EU:C:2004:I-2781,
§40: ‘Determining the conditions under which such a measure may be adopted requires that the division
of powers and the institutional balance established by the Treaty in the field of the common commercial
policy be duly taken into account, since in this case the measure seeks to reduce the risk of conflict related
to the existence of technical barriers to trade in goods’.
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Commission, falls within the scope of that Treaty provision.45 In other words, a
broad interpretation of Article 7 so as to include a ‘Pre-Article 7 Procedure’ is
legally conceivable by implication.46 As a rule of interpretation, implied powers can
flow from the grant of express powers. In this situation, there is an explicit power –
i.e. the power to launch an Article 7 procedure – from which another power can be
construed as being inherent.47
On the other hand, whenever an EU institution enjoys a discretionary power, its
intervention is to be coherent with the objectives for which the same power is
granted. In that respect, it is arguable that the political early warning tool, as
envisaged in the Commission’s Communication, is consistent with the objectives of
Article 7 TEU. In that legal framework, the Commission could even collect
information and carry out checks in accordance with the general provision of Article
337 TFE.48 Moreover, the Communication examines carefully and impartially all
the relevant elements of the situations upon which that mechanism may be
triggered, complying also with the duty to state the reasons (Article 296(2) TFEU).
The Commission’s act seems in line with the proportionality principle (Article 5(4)
TFEU) too, since the new political mechanism appears both suitable to pursue the
aim of the Article 7 procedure, and necessary in the sense that no other option is
available to the Commission. In short, by making full use of an existing mechanism
in line with the Council’s demand, the Commission neither derogates primary law,
nor adversely affects the principle of institutional balance.
It may be added, as to the former, that the procedure envisaged by the
Commission is not contra legem (i.e. is not inconsistent with primary law): it does
not deviate from the procedure, conditions and objectives set out in Article 7 TEU.
Nor does amend that provision since it falls within the discretionary power
45 It has been argued that the institutions cannot build upon Article 7 procedure. This is not convincing.
As long as the conditions indicated in the text are fulfilled, institutions may build upon the discretionary
powers granted to them by the treaties. In that respect, institutional practice is so rich in cases, which
contradict that argument. For instance, lawyers who are familiar with infringements procedure practice do
know the ‘EU pilot’ and ‘SOLVIT’ procedures. The Commission set up them through the means of non
binding acts: all the member states have accepted those procedures and it is evident that unanimity does
not permit Governments to depart from primary law. It is also worth mentioning that all the agreements,
declarations and modus vivendi concerning codifications, better law making and so forth show that
institutions and member states are quite inclined to build upon existing primary law rules. In other words,
a restrictive approach according to which institutions must stick to written law does not reflect the rich
institutional practice. In addition, if that argument was pertinent, how could the Council ground the new
political oversight (see Sect. 5) approved by consensus under the Italian presidency?
46 According to Kochenov and Pech 2015, p. 11, Article 7 ‘necessarily implicitly empowers the
Commission to investigate any potential risk of serious breach of the EU’s values’. They conclude
however that the Commission’s light-touch proposal falls short of effectively addressing threats to the
rule of law within the EU.
47 A specific instance of this rationale occurred when the ECJ forged the well-known ERTA doctrine: the
implied power to conclude international agreements in the fields in which the EU enjoyed no explicit
competence has been justified on the basis that primary law provisions, which allowed the EU to exercise
competences internally (Case 22/70, ERTA, EU:C:1971:263, §16; Opinion No. 1/76 EU:C:1977:741, §3,
and No. 2/91, EU:C:1993:I-1061, §7). The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) has codified that judicial doctrine
(Articles 3(2) and 216(1) TFEU), as the ECJ has pointed out in Case C-114/12, Commission v. Council,
EU:C:2014: not yet published, §§64 ff.
48 Moxham and Stefanelli (2013), p. 22.
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conferred to the Commission insofar as the triggering of the mechanism is
concerned. As regards the latter condition, the Communication appears respectful of
the principle of institutional balance since it does not impact on the powers
attributed to other institutions pursuant to Article 7 TEU.49
Conclusively, the ‘new Rule of Law Framework’ may be conceived as a praeter
legem procedure, which ultimately derives from the Treaties by implication.
5 The Opportunity to Avoid a Legal Conclusion in the Council
That being said, a legal conclusion or debate in the Council as regards the
Commission’s powers under Article 7 TEU, was unnecessary. As a matter of
principle the final word about the consistency with the Treaties of the Commu-
nication does not pertain to the EU political institutions, but to the ECJ (in
accordance with Article 19 TEU). Unlike under international law where in principle
each organ of an international institution is, at least prima facie, able to determine
its own jurisdiction,50 in the more evolved EU legal order a strict judicial approach
prevails.51 The locus of authoritative decision-making, as regards the legality of the
activity of EU institutions, ultimately lies with the ECJ.52 Put differently,
complementary normative activity is subject to a judicial legal assessment: only
the validation of the ECJ confers to the social rule created by the practice of the
institution the guise of a legal rule. Until the Court has ruled on the legality with
primary law of a given act, only hypothetical reconstructions can be made.
That explains the reasons why, bearing in mind that there was no specific judicial
precedent dealing with the same issue, it would have been better to skip such a
political discussion. Besides, a lawyer may reasonably be quite apprehensive about
the ideological, distorted or watered-down approaches that a complex subject, such
as the rule of law, may receive in a debate within the Council – whose political
nature may not be well suited for such legal determinations. In addition, there was
no clear consensus among member states to endorse the ‘New Rule of Law
Framework’, since several Governments objected to its legality.
Lastly, it is worth recalling that if the Commission initiates a pre-Article 7
procedure issuing a recommendation addressed to a state, the latter could challenge
it since it would be an act producing legal effects. On the contrary, the same
49 The Italian Presidency Doc. No. 15206/14 ‘Ensuring respect for the rule of law in the European
Union’, could have pointed out in a clearer way that the Commission Communication is not only ‘without
prejudice to the Commission’s powers of launching procedures under Article 258 TFEU in case of
breaches falling under the scope of EU law’ (point 10, at 3), but that the same holds true as regards the
powers of other institutions under Article 7 procedure.
50 Certain Expenses case, ICJ Rep., 1962, 151, at 168; Sarooshi (2007), p. 22.
51 One illustrative example of this approach is the Bosman case, whereby the ECJ stressed its primary
role, pointing out that, ‘except where such powers are expressly conferred upon it, the Commission may
not give guarantees concerning the compatibility of specific practices with the Treaty’ (Case C-415/93,
Bosman, EU:C:1995:I-5041, §136).
52 In that respect, the EU legal order reflects Kelsen’s theories according to which the judiciary is the
ultimate guardian of the system Kelsen (1980), p. 128, and as regards international law, Kelsen (1939),
p. 253 and pp. 264–266.
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requisite seems difficult to prove as regards the Commission’s Communication
itself, which is a non-binding act.53 It does not mean however that the
Communication is deprived of legal effects: it may for instance reflect the practice
of the Commission as regards the interpretation of Article 7. Should that
interpretation be correct, it could even entail that member states are expected to
comply with it according to the duty of loyal cooperation. Yet a situation of legal
uncertainty follows, as long as the Commission does not trigger the new mechanism
against a given member state. That leaves open the question of the practical
importance of member states objections to the way in which the power attributed to
the Commission under Article 7 have been interpreted, insofar as a clear legal
remedy against the Communication does not exist.
Finally, the coherence of the objecting states against the early warning system
set out by the Commission should be assessed in the light of the new political
mechanism of the Council. If the Article 7 procedure cannot be developed by
political institutions, first and foremost by the Commission, so that they are
prevented from exercising powers beyond those that the provision accords to
them explicitly, one may wonder whether it would be legally feasible to accept
political oversight exercised by the Council. That leads us to the last point to
mention.
6 The Council Political Way Out
Without explicitly questioning the legality of the Commission’s Communication
against the principle of conferral, the Council has shaped an additional political way
out based on a new rule of law dialogue. The Italian presidency, acting as an honest
broker, pursued this route. It focused on the role of the Council to accompany the
future development of a new framework to strengthen the rule of law within the EU
in accordance with the treaties.54 Indeed, ‘Council and member states meeting
within the Council’ decided to ‘commit themselves to establishing a dialogue
among all member states within the Council to promote and safeguard the rule of
law in the framework of the Treaties’; and ‘agree that this dialogue will take place
once a year in the Council, in its General Affairs configuration, and be prepared by
the COREPER (Presidency), following an inclusive approach’.55
This way out has both positive and negative aspects. As regards the former, the
Council agreed that ‘this dialogue will be developed in a way which is
53 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council EU:C:1971:263, §§38 to 42; Case C-366/88 France v. Commission
EU:C:1990:348, §8; Case C-58/94 Netherlands v. Council EU:C:1996:171, §24). As is known, measures
binding only the institutions concerned and giving no rights or obligations on third parties, do not
constitute acts adversely affecting any person against which an action for annulment can be brought (Case
366/88, France v. Commission, §9, relating to internal instructions). The Court has consistently held that
only measures producing binding legal effects are open to challenge by an action for annulment (order in
Case 135/84, F.B. v. Commission, EU:C:1984:320, §6; order in Case C-50/90, Sunzest v. Commission,
EU:C:1991:253, §12).
54 See Italian Presidency Doc. No. 15206/14 of 14 November 2014 ‘Ensuring respect for the rule of law
in the European Union’, point 14.
55 Press release 16936/14, 3362nd Council Meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 16 December 2014.
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complementary with other […] International Organisations’.56 Arguably, the
Council considers that ensuring respect for the rule of law by member states does
not pertain to the EU only, but also to other international organisations and namely
to the Council of Europe.57 This is hardly questionable. Yet the Council’s
determination does not imply the externalization of an EU task.58
As regards the negative aspects, the Council’s conclusions reveal loopholes to be
addressed by subsequent Presidencies if they wish to trigger this new mechanism.59
One may further opine that the Council’s conclusions do not appear ambitious
enough, since they remain within the realm of political dialogue. A new political
oversight is not a bad thing per se, though it hardly ensures the respect of the rule of
law in an effective manner. However, any more ambitious result would likely imply
the revision of the Treaty and, as said above, that was outside the scope of the entire
exercise. Indeed, a system of political dialogue to foster the respect of the rule of law
at a domestic level had to be shaped ‘a Trattati costanti’ (without revising the treaties).
Moreover, one may wonder what an inclusive approach actually means.60 If it
refers to the involvement of the member states concerned in the rule of law dialogue,
the necessity of such wording is doubtful. Another noteworthy element is that the
decision to set up a political dialogue has been adopted by both the Council and the
members states meeting within the Council. This formulation seems to entail that
debating about possible threats to the rule of law in member states does not fall, at
least not entirely, within the current jurisdiction of the Council. Legally speaking, this
is surprising. The Article 7 procedure and the related powers conferred to the
institutions therein, as well the ECJ case law cited above,61 seem to lean in the
opposite direction. Indeed it would be quite difficult to demonstrate that under Article
7, the EU does not enjoy a comprehensive competence to supervise the application of
the rule of law, as a foundational value of the EU, in the member states.
The problem is to find the political strength to trigger that procedure, perhaps in
addition to political dialogue.62 However, as a matter of fact, on 13 January 2016
56 Press release 16936/14, n. 55, 21, point 5.
57 For a brief overview and analysis of monitoring systems of the rule of law according to some
international instruments see Moxham and Stefanelli, n. 48, p. 6.
58 Against externalization of the EU tasks concerning respect for the rule of law to Council of Europe’s
bodies, see Kochenov and Pech (2015), p. 10.
59 For instance, it is not clear what evidences the Council dialogue could be based upon. The avenue to
rely on Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) data and evidence could likely be pursued provided that the
FRA mandate is enhanced.
60 Kochenov and Pech, n. 46, p. 14.
61 Section 2.
62 See the European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary (2015/2700(RSP),
in which it urged ‘the Commission to activate the first stage of the EU framework to strengthen the rule of
law, and therefore to initiate immediately an in-depth monitoring process concerning the situation of
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary, assessing a potential systemic serious
breach of the values on which the Union is founded as per Article 2 TEU, including the combined impact
of a number of measures exacerbating the state of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, and
evaluating the emergence of a systemic threat to the rule of law in that Member State that could develop
into a clear risk of a serious breach within the meaning of Article 7 TEU; asks the Commission to report
back on this matter to Parliament and the Council before September 2015’.
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the Commission has launched a dialogue with Poland under the Rule of Law
Framework because it was concerned about the composition of the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal, as well as of the domestic changes in the law on the
Public Service Broadcasters.63
7 Conclusions
Respect for the rule of law in the EU cannot be taken for granted. It is essential for
each member state and for the EU itself. As a matter of course states have different
national experiences in the development of their systems of the rule of law so as that
its notion is naturally connected with their respective national context. However, in
the EU there are common features and values as identified by its judiciary, as well as
by its practice (such as, for instance, the refusal of death penalty). Respect for the
rule of law in the member states is also a responsibility for the EU institutions. If the
EU strives to protect it, the rule of law will benefit the EU and its citizens as a
whole. A stronger EU can legitimize itself in the eyes of the citizens primarily
through its outcomes aimed, among other things, at construing effective instruments
capable to oversight respect for the rule of law at national level.
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